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1. What is “Wrong” with Prediction?
The term “prediction” is commonly used throughout science. As part of expert language, however,
the term holds a partially conflicting status because its meaning is not always properly perceived
among both scientists and recipients of expert information. In judicial proceedings, for example,
the meaning of “prediction” may be that of more informal language and hence be misread as a
definite assertion. This is a cause of concern because it misconceives an essential aspect the actual
state of affairs, that is uncertainty.
In his comprehensive text Theory of Probability (1974), Bruno de Finetti explicitly highlighted a
warning (de Finetti, 1974, p. 98)1:
“Think: prevision is not prediction!”
By prediction de Finetti was referring to assertions of certainty about possible alternatives that, in
reality, are unknown to us. Actually, the possible alternatives typically refer to past, present or future
events that are not known to us with certainty. Take, for example, the event “It will rain tomorrow
at noon in the city center of London.” As a statement today, this would amount to an ascertained
truth, along with a “venture to try to ‘guess,’ among the possible alternatives, the one that will occur.”
(de Finetti, 1974, p. 70). de Finetti noted that such statements are “often made, not only by would-
be magicians and prophets, but also [at times] by experts” (de Finetti, 1974, p. 70)2 in scientific and
commercial fields. He further argued that making statements about things that are uncertain to us
should, instead, be called prevision, a term which “consists in considering, after careful reflection,
all the possible alternatives, in order to distribute among them, in the way which will appear most
appropriate, one’s own expectations, one’s own sensations of probability” (de Finetti, 1974, p. 72).
The distinction between prevision and prediction was a common important theme throughout his
writings, both mathematical and philosophical (e.g., de Finetti, 1983).
The fact that the uncritical use of “prediction” arises in connection with experts in many
important fields is worrying, and merits discussion. In forensic science, for example, the term
prediction is typically encountered in connection with the study of the relationship between results
of DNA analyses (e.g., of single-nucleotide polymorphisms) and externally visible characteristics
(EVC), such as eye and hair color. This is a lively area of research in applied genetics, with increasing
interest among forensic scientists. In particular, we may be confronted with legal cases in which a
database search of a conventional DNA profiling result does not lead to a correspondence based
1Textbox and italics as in original.
2Text in brackets added by the authors.
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on short tandem repeat (STR) markers. As a result, no potential
donor for a crime stain can be provided (e.g., Kayser and
Schneider, 2009; Walsh et al., 2014), but leads regarding EVC.
Moreover, the concept of prediction is encountered almost
endemically in the area of forensic anthropology. For example,
one reads common allusions to “sex/age/stature prediction”
based on measurements of various body parts; or in the
analysis of illegal substances, the prediction of the outcome
of additional analyses based on previously analyzed items. In
forensic psychology, prediction is used in discussions and the
assessment of the behavior of individuals (e.g., Douglas et al.,
2003).
In this brief comment, we shall take a closer look at
exemplary applications in forensic science, in particular applied
genetics, where the term prediction is now used prominently
and increasingly often. Section 2 will explain relevant subject
matter on what in current statistical literature is known as
a “predictive distribution.” This background will be used, in
Section 3 to discuss the notion of prediction with respect to
forensic applications, and to examine the extent to which the
common use of this term in forensic science is or is not well
founded. Section 4 will discuss implications of such foundational
understanding of terminology and concepts for the practice of
logical, balanced and transparent reporting in forensic science
applications. The discussion will concentrate on forensic science
and statistics (corresponding to the expertise of the authors),
but the subject matter is similarly encountered in many other
fields such as medical diagnosis and other matters in which
the use of scientific results has direct societal impact. Without
loss of generality, this also includes the theory and practice of
psychology, in particular forensic psychology.
2. Predictive Distributions in Bayesian
Statistical Theory
Prediction is a clearly defined term in standard statistical
literature, in particular among adherents of the Bayesian point of
view which is favored in this article. Formally, we can distinguish
two main elements. The first is past observations, denoted as data
such as x1, ..., xm. The second element is future observations such
as y1, . . . , yn. Our interest is to represent beliefs about possible
values of the future observations—in terms of probabilities,
conditional on the given past data. We follow several writers in
using the short-hand notation x and y for past and future data,
respectively. This order naturally translates the temporal order of
the data, although it is worth emphasizing that the future data
y are deemed to be informative about x, but not in the sense
of common allusions to “repetitions of an identical experiment”
(Lindley, 2000).
The probability distribution of uncertainty regarding past or
future observations is often asserted in one of standard known
forms. This is typically denoted by f (· | θ), in which the only
unknown feature is the parameter θ . The related probabilistic
model is known as a parametric model, and is denoted by
{f (· | θ), θ ∈ 2}. In the Bayesian paradigm 2 represents a
parameter set (e.g., Robert, 2007) which allows for the assertion
of further available information in terms of a so-called prior
distribution, usually denoted by π(θ). It summarizes the way past
values of X are asserted to inform us about possible values of Y .
Statistical inference is performed by computing a posterior
probability distribution for θ , usually denoted π(θ | x). Statistical
inference about Y on the basis of observing X = x is achieved by
the further computation of the mixture distribution
f (y|X = x) =
∫
2
f (y|θ)π(θ |X = x)dθ for the
various possible values y. (1)
To clarify this understanding, consider the graphical model [i.e.,
a Bayesian network (Cowell et al., 1999)] shown in Figure 1(i)
where, by convention, variables are denoted by capital letters.
In particular, let X denote the past data, with the corresponding
lower case letter x denoting a realization which is the observed
value of X, as introduced above. The inferential process can
be described by the dashed curved edge. By summarizing our
uncertainty about Y as informed by X via θ , we complete
the assertion of prevision. Stated otherwise, our prevision is an
assertion of uncertainty about possible but unknown values of Y ,
here summarized by an expression of our personal uncertainty in
terms of π(θ | x).
Another goal in statistics consists of contemplating about a
future observation y, where our belief structure is again described
according to the parametric model f (· | θ) above, that is f (y | θ).
The parameter θ is unknown, but one can incorporate posterior
knowledge about θ (i.e., including current observations x) and
compute a probability distribution g(y | x). It has the form of a
weighted average of all possible distributions on y, f (y | θ), with
the corresponding distribution describing personal uncertainty
about θ , that is g(y | x) =
∫
f (y | θ)π(θ | x)dθ . This is shown
in terms of the dotted edge in Figure 1(i), where capital letter
Y denotes the future data, with the corresponding lower case
letter y denoting a realization. The passage from the parameter
θ (or θ including x) to a future observation y, is referred to as
prediction in (e.g., Robert, 2007) or, following presentations in the
close spirit of de Finetti’s development, prevision (e.g., Lad, 1996).
So, g(y | x) is typically called a predictive distribution, but again,
what we mean is a prevision, that is a summary of our personal
uncertainty about the outcome y, using probability. There is no
statistical support for the notion of prediction as an assertion of
certainty about heretofore unknown observations.
It is also possible to consider a discrete variable (i.e.,
hypothesis) instead of θ , denoted H short for “hypothesis”
[shown in Figure 1(ii)] or T short for “theory,” as encountered in
general scientific reasoning (e.g., Press, 2003). The variablesH or
T can have two ore more possible realizations. They are in exactly
one of their possible realizations, but which onemay be unknown
to us. Note also that in forensic statistics, it is common to use
the notation E (short for “evidence”) (Aitken and Taroni, 2004).
The predictive distribution for the discrete case can be derived
in a similar manner, as it will be shown by means of a practical
example in Section 3. With these theoretical elements in mind,
we can now move on to examine the understanding of the term
prediction in selected areas of application.
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3. Forensic Inference, Not Prediction
Consider the following scenario: biological (trace) material from
a donor with unknown characteristics is available. DNA profiling
analyses are conducted and results are used to help inform about
features of the donor of the analyzed material. The features
of interest may be hair and eye color, for example. Is this a
situation requiring prediction as is commonly suggested (e.g.,
Pos´piech et al., 2012), more or less informally in many scientific
communications on this topic? According to the statistical
account outlined in Section 2, such analysis should properly be
called inference or, more generally, prevision.
This conclusion can be understood through the following
reconstruction. The results of DNA analyses on a trace item
from a donor whose EVC is unknown represent the available
forensic data E. These data form the basis for making an inference
about H, that is various competing propositions regarding the
EVC of the donor of the analyzed material. Thus, the focus
is on Pr(H | E), that is the posterior probability of H given
the scientific finding E, obtained through a standard application
of Bayes’ theorem. This probability distribution for the various
possible states of the variable H represents our prevision. We do
not make a prediction on what we think what EVC actually holds.
The notion of prediction arises with another aspect of the
current scenario, in particular if we turn our attention to a
future observation. Continuing the logical temporal order in
notation with respect to E, let such a future observation be
denoted F. It could consist of, for example, the analysis of
another genetic marker, or set of markers, on material that
comes from the same person as that for which results E are
available. In graphical statistical terms, this can be translated as
a diverging connection E ← H → F, where the probability
distribution for F, conditional on previous data E, is called
the predictive probability distribution [Figure 1(ii)]. It is given
by Pr(F | E) =
∑n
i Pr(F | Hi)Pr(Hi | E), when there are n
distinct hypotheses regarding the donor’s EVC.3 The expression
is also known as the (posterior) predictive distribution because it
includes knowledge of the previous experiment E. Without E, it
FIGURE 1 | Bayesian networks with variables X and E denoting past
data, and Y and F denoting future data. Both past and future data depend
on and are related through, in (i), parameter θ , belonging to the parameter
space 2, and in (ii), a variable H denoting discrete hypotheses. The dashed
edges denote the process when going from past data to the parameter, called
inference, whereas the dotted edge illustrates the process of going to future
observations.
3Note that, for the ease of argument, only the discrete case is considered here.
would reduce to the prior predictive distribution (or, marginal
distribution) of F, written Pr(F) =
∑n
i Pr(F | Hi)Pr(Hi). Use
of such predictive distributions is typically made in forensic
attribute sampling, when assessing the probability of additionally
analyzed items drawn from a consignment of items (e.g.,
Biedermann et al., 2008). In the context of our discussion here,
the important qualification regarding the term “prediction” is
that the inference performed supports a “predictive distribution,”
that is, a probabilistic distribution of our uncertainty over the
possibilities given all available evidence.
Similarly, the formal framework of analysis (Figure 1) can
capture reasoning patterns that are commonly encountered in
forensic psychology. Suppose, for example, that past observations
E regarding particular behavior (e.g., violence) need to be used
to make statements about potential future behavior F. If one can
accept that this psychological assessment task exhibits enough
structure, then the generic framework exposed in Section 2 allows
one to describe this task in precise terms, extract information
from these descriptions, and transform this information into
conclusions. More generally, the framework represents an
instance of a normative approach by providing a reference point
against which actual practice may be compared (e.g., Baron,
2012), and by guiding reasoning research (e.g., Crupi andGirotto,
2014).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
In statistical theory, the term “prediction” typically arises
in connection with so-called predictive distributions that
summarize a reasoner’s belief about future observations. de
Finetti dismissed the term because of its potential suggestion
of a definite conclusion when, in reality, the reasoner’s state of
knowledge is incomplete (i.e., one of uncertainty). He considered
assertions affected by uncertainty, expressed through probability,
to be more appropriately termed “previsions.” This term is more
general as it applies to any announced probability distribution.
That is, it is not restricted to future observations, but can apply to
past occurrences about which we are uncertain too.
To some extent, this understanding is at odds with uses of
the term “prediction” in applications such as forensic genetics
where the target of evaluation is a conditioning hypothesis H,
which is a current state of nature (e.g., regarding a person’s
EVC). Summarizing our uncertainty about the possible states
of a conditioning hypothesis H is a case of prevision. It is
not a prediction in the sense of a statement about the state of
nature that actually holds. It should be observed, however, that
a scientist’s conclusion is often used within wider contexts, such
as judicial proceedings, where the meaning of “prediction” may
be that of more informal language and hence be understood as
a definite assertion. Such a misreading of the term prediction
should be a cause of concern because it misconceives the actual
state of affairs, that is a situation characterized by uncertainty.
To avoid this kind of complication, and where the object
under investigation is the (posterior) probability of a particular
hypothesis H (e.g., regarding a person’s EVC, disease status,
etc.), given results of forensic examinations E, forensic scientists
could consider the option of referring to the reasoning process
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more generally as inference, not prediction. Nonetheless, in
forensic contexts, this should not be taken as a suggestion
that forensic scientists ought to provide inferential conclusions
regarding hypotheses of interest. There are both procedural (e.g.,
role of the scientist in the legal process) and conceptual (e.g.,
inappropriate position to justify a prior probability) reasons for
this (Redmayne, 2001; Aitken et al., 2010). Instead, according
to current understandings in the field, scientists can help make
the most reasonable use of probability by providing recipients of
expert information with a likelihood ratio (Aitken and Taroni,
2004). This kind of expression informs other participants in the
legal process about how they ought to revise their prior beliefs
regarding the competing hypotheses of interest, whatever they
may be.
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